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APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This action involves a boundary dispute between adjoining
property owners.

Plaintiffs seek to quiet title to the dis-

puted portion of land, and claim the establishment of a boundary
by acquiescence.
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\IBR COURT
At the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence, defendants
moved to dismiss the complaint.

The trial court granted the

motion and summarily dismissed plaintiffs' action, holding
that the legal doctrine of boundary by acquiescence is not
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applicable where the true boundary is capable of being ascertained.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek a reversal of the judgment of the trial
court and reinstatement of their action.

Inasmuch as re-

spondents have not yet presented their evidence, a new trial
will be required.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 10, 1951, L. H. Stratford and Ella Stratford,
his wife, purchased approximately five (5) acres of land
at 4800 South and approximately 10th East Streets in Salt
Lake County (R-111; Exhibit 28).

The property was bounded

on the north by Big Cottonwood Creek (although the actual
boundary is the subject of this litigation).

Earl C.

Morgan (the father of the defendants) owned property
north of Cottonwood Creek, and at the time of the purchase
by Stratfords operated a dairy farm on his property (R-150,

151, 153).
The following drawing (although not to scale) is
illustrative of the layout of the parties' properties.
area marked in yellow is the parcel in dispute:

- 2 -
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The Stratfords purchased their property for the purpose
of operating a hobby farm, where Mr. Stratford could raise
horses, cows, sheep, other livestock, ducks and birds (R-111,
142, 145).
At the time of the purchase of the Stratford property
in the spring of 1951, there was a partial fence in existence
along the south bank of Cottonwood Creek.

L. H. Stratford,

that same spring, reconstructed the fence using the part
that was already in existence, and adding new fence materials
to the areas where the fence was not in existence (R-116, 131,
133, 147).

The completed fence was made partly of cedar posts

and partly of steel posts; was spanned by chain link wire;
and was from five to seven feet in height (R-115).

The fence

constructed by Mr. Stratford has remained in place and unchanged since 1951, a period of more than thirty (30) years
(R-115, 139).
The Stratfords have exclusively occupied the property
to the fence line since they purchased the property (R-118).
L. H. Stratford constructed and developed a fish pond, part
of which was on the disputed property (R-117).

The fishpond

itself was surrounded by a seven to eight foot chain link
fence with barbed wire at the top (R-117).

It was used to

stock fish and for private fishing (R-117).

In addition,

Mr. Stratford constructed a racetrack type training track to
train horses.

The training track was of wood and pipe
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construction and was located partially on the disputed property
(R-117).

The property was also used for grazing (R-118) and

for the raising of alfalfa and other grains (R-118).
Since the purchase of the property by the Stratfords, the
Morgans have never used property beyond the fence for any purpose (R-119, 147, 158).

In earlier years, there were a couple

occasions when the Morgan horses got under the fence and into
the Stratford property.

The Stratfords were upset and told

the Morgans they didn't want Morgans' horses on the Stratford
property.

Mr. Morgan said that he would see that the problem

was taken care of, which he did (R-146).
In addition to the above, no member of the Morgan family
ever made any claim to the property in dispute until shortly
prior to the collllilencement of this suit (R-119, 145, 163).
In July of 1972, L. H. Stratford died (R-111).

The property

was later conveyed by Mrs. Stratford to the plaintiffs, Charles
H. Stratford and Robert L. Harris, who hold the title in trust
for the Stratford grandchildren (R-142).

In 1979, Charles H.

Stratford had the property surveyed (R-133).

The survey dis-

closed that the metes and bounds description of the Stratford
property does not go to the creek, and that part of the disputed parcel is within the Morgan deed description (Exhibit 27).
Charles H. Stratford did not agree that the survey accurately
shows the location of the boundary line (R-134).
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Earl C. Morgan died in March of 1980 (R-152).

The defen-

dants in this action are children of Earl C. Morgan and acquired
the property from their father prior to the time of his death
(R-152).
After plaintiffs rested their case, defendants made a
motion to dismiss.

The court expressed its belief that inas-

much as the Stratford survey showed no conflict in the surveyed
b9undary between the prop·erties that there could be no dispute
or uncertainty as to the boundary.

In ruling from the bench,

the court made the following conmlent (R-174):
"I know from my discussion with the Justices at the
Supreme Court (in a case where Judge Conder participated) that if the description can be ascertained
that there is no description which is in dispute".
The court then ruled in effect that a boundary by acquiescence
can never

apply unless it is shown that the actual boundary

cannot be establised (R-174).
ARGUMENT

l

POINT I
PLAINTIFFS HAVE PRIMA FACIE ESTABLISHED A BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE
AND THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT
A.

In A Boundary By Acquiescence Case It Is Not Plaintiff's

Burden To Show That The True Boundary Is Unknown, Uncertain Or
In Dispute.
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has long been part
of the common law of the State of Utah.

The doctrine is based
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I

upon sound public policy with a view of preventing strife and
litigation, and in establishing stability in boundaries.
v. Judge, 31 Utah 269, 87 P. 809 (1906).

Holmes

It is said that peace

and good order of society is best served by leaving at rest
possible disputes over long established boundaries.

Thus, where

there has been any type of recognizable physical boundary, which
has been accepted as such for a long period of time, it should
be presumed that any dispute or disagreement over the boundary
has been reconciled in some manner.

Baum v. Defa, 525 P.2d 725

(Utah 1974).
In implementing the above purposes the Utah Courts have
consistently and repeatedly held that there are four necessary
elements that must be shown in order to establish a boundary
by acquiescence.
1.

The elements are:

Occupation up to a visible line marked definitely by

monuments, fences or buildings.
2.

Acquiescence in the line as a boundary (meaning mutual

recognition).
3.

For a long period of time (generally considered to be

twenty (20) years).
4.

By adjoining land owners.

Fucco v. Williams, 15 Utah 2d 156; 389 P.2d 1943 (1964); King v.
Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 135, 378 P.2d 893 (1963); Hale v. Frakes,
600 P.2d 556 (Utah 1979); Monroe v. Harper, 619 P.2d 323 (Utah
1980).
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If all of the above elements are met, then the burden
shifts, and it becomes the responsibility of the party denying the boundary by acquiescence to show by competent evidence
that a boundary is not established.
King v. Fronk, supra.

Fucco v. Williams, supra;

Specifically, the cases hold that a

plaintiff is not required to produce evidence showing that there
is a dispute or uncertainty as to the true boundary.

The

existence of a dispute or uncertainty is a fact that is presumed from the passage of time.

King v. Fronk, supra; Brown v.

Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 232 P.2d 202 (19Sl);Motzkus v. Carroll,
7 Utah 2d 237, 322 P.2d 391 (1958).

In Brown, for example, the

court states:
"But the Tripp case does not require a party relying
upon a boundary which has been acquiesced in for a
long period of time to produce evidence that the
location of the true boundary was ever unknown, uncertain or in dispute. That the true boundary was
uncertain or in dispute and that the parties agreed
upon the recognized boundary as the dividing line
will be implied from the parties' long acquiescence".
And in Motzkus v. Carroll, supra, the court held as follows:
"From the foregoing, it is clear that where a party
by evidence establishes a long period of acquiescence in a fence as marking the boundary line between
two tracts, he is not required to also produce evidence that the location of the true boundary line
was ever unknown, uncertain or in dispute. The
establishment of a long period of acquiescence in a
fence as marking the boundary line between the two
tracts by the respective owners gives rise to a presumption that the true boundary line was in dispute
or uncertain, which places, at least, the burden of
producing evidence that there was no dispute or uncertainty but that the true boundary line was known
to the respective owners on the party claiming that
such was the fact. Where, as here, there is no
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evidence on that question other than the proof
of acquiescence in the fence as marking the boundary
line for the required long period of time, the trial
court must find that the boundary line by acquiescence has been established".
And in King v. Fronk, supra, the court states that the absence
of dispute or uncertainty in fixing a boundary is an element
"which, it is said, might be eliminated as a factor by an im1
plied agreement based on passage of time".
B.

Defendants Have Not Met Their Burden To Show An

Absence of Dispute Or Uncertainty As To The Boundary Line.
If the above authorities

acc~rately

represent the law in

the State of Utah the question is thus posed:

Does the fact,

in and of itself, that the true boundary line is capable of
being ascertained overcome the presumption of a dispute or uncertainty in the boundary line?
dismissed plaintiffs' complaint.
has committed reversable error.

If so, the trial court properly
But if not, the trial court
It is plaintiffs' position

of course, that it does not.
Counsel has been unable to find any reported cases holding that a boundary by acquiescence is precluded if the true
boundary is capable of being ascertained.

Indeed it is suggested

1 At footnote 5 in King v. Fronk, supra, the court goes even
further and states that a boundary by acquiescence can be based
upon mistake. And in Baum v. Defa, supra, the court upheld a
boundary by acquiescence even though the alleged boundary fence
was constructed at a time when both tracts were in common
ownership.
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that in virtually every boundary by acquiescence case it is
possible to find the true boundary.

There are numerous cases

in the Utah Reports where boundaries by acquiescence have
been established.

See e.g. King v. Fronk, supra; Motzkus v.

Carroll, supra; Brown v. Peterson Development Company, 622
P.2d 1175 (Utah 1980).

The cases usually recite the location

of the true boundary as an admitted or proven fact.

The

ability to locate the true boundary through deed descriptions,
so far as counsel is aware, hasn't even been argued as being
inconsistent with a boundary by acquiescence.
In the instant case, there are many possible circumstances
that could have caused an uncertainty about the boundary line.
For example, the plat at the back of plaintiffs' abstract of
title (Exhibit 28) shows Big Cottonwood Creek as the boundary
of the property.

Obviously, if the 1979 survey admitted into

evidence is correct there must have been a movement of the creek
at some point in time.
when the creek moved.

There is no evidence to show how or
There is, however, a body of law to

the effect that boundaries follow stream beds in the event
of accretion or erosion, but do not follow stream beds in the
event of avulsion or sudden change.2

78 Am Jur 2d, Waters §411.

The very existence of this body of law could easily have created
2 It is also presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary
that the change was made through erosion and not avulsion.
78 Am Jur 2d, Waters §427.
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an uncertainty or dispute between the adjoining land owners
as to the location of their boundary.
There are also possibilities that errors were made in
earlier surveys (Mr. Charles H. Stratford testified that he
did not agree with the survey made in 1979).

It is even

possible that the parties executed documents changing the
boundaries and that the documents are lost or

unrecorded.

The boundary could even have been established upon an earlier
claim of adverse possession.

All of these things may be

speculative; however, it must be remembered that defendants,
not plaintiffs, have the burden to establish the absence of
an uncertainty in the boundary line.

After 30 years of

acquiescence it simply isn't reasonable to believe there was
no uncertainty, and certainly there was no evidence before
the court to overcome the presumption.

It is unfortunate that

the parties who really knew about the boundary dispute are now
deceased.

This, however, is but another reason why a boundary

of long standing should not be disturbed.

If the parties know-

ledgable about the circumstances never complained about the
boundary, it would seem that the court should not permit heirs,
having no knowledge to complain.
It should also be pointed out that in the instant case,
the Stratfords not only reconstructed the boundary fence, but
also constructed improvements upon the disputed portion of
the property, that is a fishpond and a training track.
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It is

said that the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence rests
partly upon the principle of estoppel, and that a landowner
who knows the true line and silently permits an adjoining
owner to make improvements is estopped to claim the true

\I
I
I

boundary.

12 Am Jur 2d, Boundaries §89.

At best this

principle should be an absolute bar to defendants' claims;
at worst, it is persuasive evidence of the uncertainty of the
boundary and the belief by Earl C. Morgan that the Stratfords
were on their own land.
In summary, it is clear that there was insufficient evidence from which the defendants could rebut the presumption of
a dispute or uncertainty in the boundary.

The only evidence

at all on this issue was the deed descriptions and the 1979
survey, and the ability of the trial court to ascertain the
true boundaries therefrom.

It is illogical that this evidence

alone could overcome the presumption, particularly inasmuch as
disputes and boundary uncertainties can easily arise from circumstances other than deed descriptions.

There is no case

authority to support the position of the trial court.

The

position is not consistent with the policy of the law to give
stability to boundaries of long standing.
C.

The Case of Madsen v. Clegg Was Not Intended To Over-

rule Established Utah Case Law.
In granting defendants' Motion to Dismiss in this case,
the trial court indicated that it was relying upon the recent
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case of Madsen v. Clegg, 639 P.2d 726 (Utah 1981).

Unfortunately,

Madsen discusses the law of boundary by acquiescence but does
not touch upon the matter of presumptions.

A casual reading of

the case would seem to imply that a party claiming a boundary
by acquiescence must prove the existence of a dispute or uncertainty.

However, a careful reading of the case shows that the

party denying the acquiesced boundary overwhelmingly proved
either a lack of dispute or a lack of acquiescense. The facts
in Madsen showed as follows:

1.

A fence existed on the true boundary line at the time

of the construction of the second fence relied upon as the
acquiesced boundary.
2.

There was affirmative testimony that the new fence had

never been agreed upon as a boundary.
3.

The plaintiffs paid taxes every year for the purpose

of preserving his claim to the entire property.

4.

Plaintiffs had made application for a well, support-

ing his testimony that he regarded the disputed property as his
own.

5.

Plaintiffs actually drilled a well to "prove up" his

water rights.
6.

Plaintiffs used the property from time to time to

trap muskrats.
It is little wonder in Madsen that the court found that the
evidence utterly failed to establish that a boundary had been

- 13 -
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established by mutual acquiescence.

None of the above facts,

nor anything similar thereto, appear in the instant case.
There is nothing in Madsen to imply that the court intended
to overrule case law of long standing.

The court even affirma-

tively stated "that in the absence of an express agreement as
to the location of the boundary between adjoining landowners,
the lawwill imply an agreement fixing the boundary as located,
if it can do so consistently with the facts appearing (emphasis
added)".

Some of the very cases relied upon by plaintiffs

are cited with approval in Madsen.

If the court intended to

overrule these cases, it would have said so.

It would seem

that the common law of the state should not be overruled by implication.
There is further no language at all in Madsen to the effect
that a boundary by acquiescence cannot exist if the true boundary
can be ascertained (the standard applied by the trial court in
the instant case).
Madsen should be construed by the court only in light of
its own facts.

If, however, the court truly intended to make

a drastic departure from the prior law, then Madsen should be
reconsidered in light of the strong policy of the law to stabilize
boundaries.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS'
PROFFERED EVIDENCE
During the course of the trial, the court sustained objections
to plaintiffs' proffer of an attorney's title opinion given to
L. H. Stratford at the time the Stratfords purchased the property
in 1951 (proffered Exhibit 29; R-120, 165); to correspondence
between L. H. Stratford and the Salt Lake County Commission relating
to the washing conditions on Big Cottonwood Creek (proferred
Exhibit 30; R-121, 166); and to the proffered testimony from
Mrs. Ella Stratford as to her understanding that the north
boundary of the Stratford property was the center of Big Cottonwood Creek (R-143).

Plaintiffs submit that all of these rulings

were erroneous.
The Title Opinion.

The title opinion was a communication

between Mr. Stratford and his attorney wherein referencewasmade
to the movement of the creek bed.

The opinion also makes reference

to Mr. Stratford's belief that the Stratford property went beyond
the creek.

It also advises Mr. Stratford as to the law of

accretion and avulsion.

This evidence was excluded on the ground

of hearsay.
Hearsay is generally defined as any out of court statement
3 The hearsay
offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.

3 Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence.
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rule does not operate to render inadmissible every statement
or writing made by an out of court declarant.

It does not ex-

clude evidence offered to prove the fact that a cormnunication
was made, rather than the truth of the cormnunication.

Where the

very fact of the communication becomes independently relevant,
regardless of its truth or falsity, the evidence is not hearsay.
Durfey v. Board of Education of Wayne County, 604 P.2d 480 (Utah
1979); Webb v. Webb, 123 Utah 16; 253 P.2d 372 (1949); 29 Am Jur
2d,Evidence §497.

Where the state of mind of a person is a

relevant fact, declarations showing the state of raind are admissible
as primary evidence, notwithstanding that the declarant is unavailable as a witness.

29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §650.

The outcome of this litigation turns solely upon the question
of whether there was an uncertainty in the boundary line.

It

would seem that the state of mind of the landowner is highly
probative of the existence or nonexistence of an uncertainty.

The

title opinion was not offered to prove the truth of anything stated
therein.

It was offered to show Mr. Stratford's state of mind

and that he believed his boundary extended beyond the creek.
The mere fact that Mr. Stratford asked his attorney and received
advice about a questionable boundary, lends high credibility to
the existence of a reasonable uncertainty in the boundary line.
This evidence was not hearsay and should have been received by
the trial court.
Correspondence With Salt Lake County.

The correspondence
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between L. H. Stratford and the Salt Lake County Commission likewise was offered to show Mr. Stratford's state of mind.

It was

not offered to prove the truth of anything in the letters, but
only to show that Mr. Stratford treated the property to the creek
as his own.

The same authorities that apply to the title opinion

would also compel a determination that this evidence is not hearsay.
Testimony From Mrs. Stratford.

Mrs. Ella Stratford, the

widow of L. H. Stratford, proffered testimony that she understood
their boundary line to extend to the center of Big Cottonwood
Creek.

This evidence was objected to and excluded without any

grounds being stated for the objection.

The issue before the

court was whether or not an uncertainty or dispute existed as
to the boundary line.

Mrs. Stratford was the only original party

that was still alive.

Her understanding, even though subjective,

would be relevant as to whether a dispute or uncertainty existed.
It

could, of course, be argued that her testimony is self serving,

but this would go to the weight and not the admissibility of the
evidence.
Under the theory upon which the judge disposed of the case,
the evidence exclusions may not have made a material difference.
On retrial, however, this evidence

~ay

become very important to

plaintiff's case and the Supreme Court should rule on these issues
so that the errors will not be perpetuated.
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POINT III
THE FORM OF THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL WAS IMPROPER

The judgment of the court (R-90) decrees that plaintiffs
have no fee simple interest in certain property described
by metes and bounds in the judgment.

The legal descriptions

are taken from Exhibit 27 and include areas in which the
Morgans have no record title.

The Morgan property is not

contiguous with Stratfords entire north boundary, but only
part of it (see illustration at page 3).

Thus, the lan-

guage of the decree clouds a portion of property possessed
by plaintiffs in which the defendants have no interest.
The posture of this case on appeal is the granting
of a motion to dismiss at the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence.

The judgment of dismissal should be modified to

merely decree that plaintiffs' action against defendants
based upon boundary by acquiescence is dismissed.
This issue is, of course, moot if the appellants prevail
under Point I of this brief.
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO AMEND
THE PLEADINGS TO CONFORM WITH THE EVIDENCE
Plaintiffs approached the trial of this case with a strong
belief that they could easily prove all of the elements necessary to establish a boundary by acquiescence.

For this reason,

they did not see any need to rely upon adverse possession.

How-

ever, plaintiffs were caught by complete surprise when Judge
Conder explained his interpretation of Madsen v. Clegg, supra,
as being a radical departure from prior case law.

Plaintiffs

therefore moved to amend the complaint to conform with the evidence and add an additional cause of action based upon adverse
possession (R-166).

This motion was denied by the trial court

because 1) plaintiffs had earlier indicated to the court that
they did not intend to rely upon adverse possession and 2) because the trial court did not believe the evidence showed that
the Stratfords had paid taxes on the disputed parcel (R-174).
As to 1), in hindsight it may not have been the smartest
thing to be so over-confident and to rely upon what counsel
considered to be plaintiffs' strongest theory.

However, the

adverse possession evidence was before the court and not really
in dispute.

Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, pro-

vides that when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried
by express or implied consent, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.
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The court

has recently interpreted this rule to mean that judgments
should be granted in accordance with the law and the evidence
as the ends of justice require; and that this is true whether
the pleadings are actually amended or not; and in pursuing this
objective the proper application of the rules is that amendments
are to be allowed if necessary where a case has been tried on
a different issue or a different theory than has been pleaded.
First Security Bank of Utah v. Colonial Ford, Inc., 597 P.2d 859
(Utah 1979).

The ends of justice would require that the court

consider adverse possession.
As to 2), the tax notice in evidence (Exhibit 31) was
representative of all tax notices received from 1951 through
1981 and it was stipulated that the Stratfords paid the taxes
on this description during that period (R-122, 123).

Although

the tax description is the same as the deed description, the
tax notice shows the Stratfords property to contain 5.07 acres.
The survey of the Stratford deed description shows 4.77 acres
(Exhibit 27).

The difference of .30 acres is very close to

the amount of acreage in the disputed parcel, and the disputed
parcel is, of course, the only other property possessed by
the Stratfords.

Thus, the Stratfords have in fact been paying

taxes on the entire parcel that they possess.

Under these

circumstances, it is urged that a prima facie showing has
been made that would satisfy the tax payment requirement of
§78-12-12, Utah Code Annotated.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon all of the arguments and authorities as cited
herein, it is respectfully urged that the judgment of dismissal
of the trial court be reversed and that the matter be remanded
for a new trial.

Appellants also urge the court to make

rulings on the evidence issues in order to avoid further
error upon the retrial.
Respectfully submitted,

ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST
David E. West
1300 Walker Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellants
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